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Abstract
Nowadays, intrusion detection systems do not only
aim to detect attacks; but they go beyond by providing
reaction mechanisms to cope with detected attacks, or at
least reduce their effects. Previous research works have
proposed several methods to automatically select possible
countermeasures capable of ending the detected attack,
but without taking into account their side effects. In fact,
countermeasures can be as harmful as the detected attack.
Moreover, sometimes selected countermeasures are not
adapted to the attacker’s actions and/or knowledge. In this
paper, we propose to turn the reaction selection process
intelligent by giving means to (i) quantify the effectiveness
and select the countermeasure that has the minimum
negative side effect on the information system by adopting
a risk assessment and analysis approach, and (ii) assess the
skill and knowledge level of the attacker from a defensive
point of view.
keywords: Intrusion detection system, attack scenario,
countermeasure, risk analysis, potentiality, impact, skill
and knowledge.
1 Introduction
In intrusion detection approach, the main objective is to
detect and identify attacks or intrusions; and then react to
counter them, to block them, or to mitigate their impact
on the information system (IS). There are two different ap-
proaches for the reaction perspective: hot reaction [15] and
policy based reaction [17, 12]. The first aims to launch a lo-
cal action on the target machine to end a process, or on tar-
get network component to block a traffic, that are the cause
of the launched alerts. The second acts on more general
scope: it considers not only the threats reported in the alerts,
but also constraints and objectives of the organization oper-
ating the IS and this by modifying the access control policy.
Therefore a trade-off can be established between security
objectives, operation objectives and constraints. Whatever
the adopted approach, each countermeasure can have nega-
tive or positive side effects. The same countermeasure capa-
ble of ending an attack could make the IS more vulnerable,
expose it to other attacks, or even have an overall impact
more disastrous than the attack itself. For instance, Fire-
wall reconfiguration is effective against a denial of service
(DoS) attack, but can be harmful if valuable connections to
a critical server could be potentially lost.
Therefore many questions emerge: Is it better to stand
still? Or is the attack harmful enough to react? In this case,
which countermeasure must be selected with minimum neg-
ative side effects? To answer these questions, we adopt a
risk assessment and analysis approach. This approach is al-
ready used to analyze and evaluate the risks that threaten
organization assets. We aim to use the same approach to
evaluate the effectiveness of each countermeasure in real-
time, and improve the automated reaction mechanism. The
first step of a risk analysis method is to collect data that
describes the system state in real-time. The second step is
analyzing them and finding the potential threats and their
severity. The final step is to study the countermeasure effec-
tiveness to eliminate these threats or reduce their severity:
The goal is not always to block the attack, but to minimize
the risk incurred by target IS. Therefore a risk assessment
method is used to evaluate and quantify the risk of an at-
tack and its countermeasures. The method is useful to de-
cide when it is suitable to react, and which countermeasure
should be activated.
Another important aspect is the Attackers Skills and
Knowledge level (SK Level). Such data is useful for the au-
tomated reaction process. If a novice script kiddie attacker
is trying to establish a remote session, a simple TCP reset
will be enough to eliminate the detected threat. Otherwise,
in the case of an experienced attacker, the TCP reset can be
ineffective and a firewall reconfiguration may be needed.
Therefore assessing the SK Level make the reaction deci-
sion module more accurate and effective. We can assume
that a risk assessment and analysis approach combined with
the assessment of the attackers skill and knowledge level
make the automated process of reaction and countermea-
sure selection more accurate, realistic, cost effective, and
with minimum intervention of the human administrator.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. To
determine when a reaction is required and which is the best
countermeasure to activate, our solution using risk analy-
sis and skill and knowledge assessment approaches will be
presented in section II. The implementation of our model
and the conducted tests are showed in section III. In section
IV, other reaction models and risk analysis models from the
literature are presented. Finally section V concludes the pa-
per.
2 Solution
To react against attacks, an efficient diagnostic procedure
to detect and identify the intrusions is needed. However, due
to the limitation and unreliability of the intrusion detection
probes like SNORT [10], only low-level events can be de-
tected with potentially high rates of false alarms. Therefore,
to detect and recognize the current attack, an alert correla-
tion procedure is required for proper reaction. The corre-
lation procedure recognizes relationships between alerts in
order to associate these alerts to a more global intrusion sce-
nario, and the intrusion objectives that the attacker is seek-
ing to accomplish. There are many approaches that can be
used for this purpose: implicit [21], explicit [18, 23], and
semi-explicit [14, 24] correlations. The implicit approach
tries to establish implicit relations, e.g. statiscal relations,
between the observed alerts or events. On other hand, in
the explicit approach, whole attack scenarii are defined us-
ing explicit relations between the alerts or events. This ap-
proach is static because it requires an exhaustive definition
for all the known attacks, and it is not adapted to the non-
automated attacks. The semi-explicit approach is based on
the description of the elementary intrusions corresponding
to the alerts. The LAMBDA [16] language can be used
to describe these elementary steps by defining their pre-
conditions and post-conditions. This approach then finds
causal relationships between these elementary alerts and
connects these elementary alerts when such a relationship
exists.
The correlation procedure then consists in building a sce-
nario that corresponds to an attack graph. The attack graph
is a set of paths where the nodes are the elementary attack
steps; the attacker choses a path and execute these elemen-
tary steps to achieve his intrusion objective. We have de-
cided to use this approach due to its flexibility and dynam-
icity: we do not have to define static exhaustive relations be-
tween the elementary steps to construct the attack scenarii,
but instead, these relations can be discovered dynamically
in real-time.
Semi-Explicit Correlation Definition Two LAMBDA
models A and B are correlated if the post-condition of A
matches the pre-condition of B. This semi-explicit [14, 24]
approach is more generic and flexible than the other cor-
relation approaches, because only the elementary steps are
defined as entities and not the whole attack scenarii. A short
description of the LAMBDA model fields of an elementary
step is presented; for a formal description interesting read-
ers can refer to [16]:
• Pre-conditions: This field describes the IS state re-
quired so that the attacker is able to perform the step.
• Post-conditions: This field describes the IS state after
the execution of the step.
• Detection: This field is used for the mapping of a
LAMBDA model to the appropriate alert.
• Verification: This field can be used to verify if a step is
successfully executed.
In this paper, we will need mostly the first two fields (i.e.
pre-conditions and post-conditions); examples will be given
in section III.
Regarding reaction, this approach can provide a precise
diagnosis of the ongoing intrusion scenario by construction
the attack graph, predict the potential future steps and the
intrusion objectives. Using an approach similar to the one
used to describe elementary intrusions, elementary counter-
measures can be specified. In this case, anti-correlation [13]
can be used to find the countermeasures capable of ending
a detected scenario.
Anti-Correlation Definition Two LAMBDA models A
and B are anti-correlated if the post-condition of A matches
the pre-condition negation of B. The anti-correlation [13]
approach is based upon finding the appropriate countermea-
sure that turn an elementary future step of an attack unex-
ecutable due to preconditions value modifications. There-
fore, using the anti-correlation approach, the administrator
knows which countermeasures from a predefined library are
capable of blocking the threat.
2.1 Risk Assessment Model
As explained in the previous section, the anti-correlation
approach can be used to generate a set of candidate coun-
termeasure capable of ending the detected attack, but with-
out assessing its impact nor the candidate countermeasure.
Therefore, this reaction approach can be refined by com-
bining it with the risk analysis model proposed in [19]. This
model is used to evaluate the total risk gravity of the IS once
an attack is detected and after simulating the execution of
the candidate countermeasure. Only the countermeasures
that reduce the total risk gravity are kept and a new set of
Risk Efficient Countermeasures (Risk Eff CM) is instanti-
ated. The total risk gravity can be assessed after evaluating
the Potentiality (Pot) and the Impact (Imp) of the detected
attacks. The structure of the model is described in Figure
1. The total risk gravity of the IS is derived from the risk
gravities of the detected attack scenarii. Each scenario risk
gravity depends on its potentiality and impact factors. In-
terested readers can refer to [19] for more details.
2.1.1 Potentiality Pot
The major factor Potentiality Pot measures the probability
of a given scenario to take place and achieve its objective
with success. To evaluate Pot, we must first evaluate its
minor factors: natural expositionExpo and dissuasive mea-
sures Diss and we have to take into account classification
of the attack also. These minor factors can be evaluated af-
ter the appropriate audit clusters are calculated. These clus-
ters are questions-tests that aim to evaluate the system state
(active services, existent vulnerabilities, etc.). The value
zero indicates that the studied scenario is impossible, and
the value MAX VALUE indicates that the occurrence and
the successful execution of the scenario are inevitable.
2.1.2 Impact Imp
The second major factor to evaluate Risk Gravity of an at-
tack scenario is Impact Imp. −−→Imp is defined as a vector
with three elements that correspond to the three fundamen-
tal security properties: Availability Avail, Confidentiality
Conf and Integrity Integ. Therefore, with each Intrusion
Objective, a vector −−→Imp is associated and should be evalu-
ated. Actually, it is not possible to statically evaluate −−→Imp
of a scenario (or more precisely the −−→Imp of the scenario’s
intrusion objective) directly because it depends on several
dynamic elements. The impact depends on the importance
of the target assets −−−→Class, and the impact reduction mea-
sures level −→IR that are deployed on the system to reduce
and limit the impact once the attack was successful.
2.1.3 Risk Gravity of an Attack Scenario or a Counter-
measure Grav
For each detected attack, the risk gravity must be evaluated
to estimate the danger level of this attack. The risk is the
combination of potentiality and impact using a predefined
function f . An attack that occurs frequently with little im-
pact may have the same risk level as another rare attack that
have significant impact. If a scenario has Pot or Imp equal
to zero, the scenario’s gravity risk Grav will be null. To as-
sess the risk Gravity of a candidate countermeasure CMu,
the same function f is used to assess the risk as shown in
the following equation:
GCMu = f(Pot = MAX VALUE, Imp = CMu.Impact)
(1)
The use of MAX VALUE for the Pot parameter is justi-
fied by the fact that countermeasures, contrary to detected
attack scenarii, do not have intrinsic potentiality. This can
be explained by the fact that once a countermeasure is se-
lected, it must be activated successfully in the IS and there-
fore its impact must be considered with maximum potential-
ity. For the attack scenarii, each one has a proper potential-
ity that must be combined with the attack scenario impact
to deduce the risk gravity.
2.1.4 Total Risk Gravity Total Grav and Total Grav′u
In most situations, the correlation and reaction modules do
not deal with one specific scenario. Instead, these modules
have to take into account many candidate and even simulta-
neous scenarii. Therefore, before estimating the total grav-
ity of risk, we must evaluate the gravity of risk of each sce-
nario in the attack graph separately. Then we define the total
gravity as an ordered vector containing the values of gravity
risk of each candidate scenario. An order relation can be de-
fined between the different instances of −−−−−−−−→Total Grav using
the lexicographic comparison. Thus, we are able to judge
which attack graph has the highest risk gravity. We define
also
−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u similarly to
−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav, where the dif-
ference is that
−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u is assessed with the new state
of the IS after the simulated execution of the countermea-
sure CMu, in other words using the new generated attack
graph that takes into account the activation of the CMu.
2.1.5 Risk Efficient Countermeasures Set
Once for each countermeasure u, GCMu and
−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u
are evaluated, −−−−−−−−−−−−−→Total Grav CMu can be evaluated :
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav CMu =
−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav′u ∪GCMu (2)
where ∪ is a concatenation operator.
Now, only the countermeasures from
Anticorrelated CM that decrease the total risk gravity
are kept and a new set Risk Eff CM is defined that
contains only risk efficient countermeasures:
∀CMu ∈ Anticorrelated CM ;
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Total Grav CMu ≤ −−−−−−−−→Total Grav (3)
⇒ CMu ∈ Risk Eff CM
Figure 1. Risk assessment structure
2.2 Skill and Knowledge Assessment
To react properly against a detected attack scenario, the
countermeasure selection process must take into account the
observed skill and knowledge of the attacker. To end an at-
tack executed by a novice, a simple close connection can
be effective, which it is not the case when facing an expert
attacker who can easy counter this reaction and a firewall
reconfiguration is needed. In general, it could be useless to
activate a complex countermeasure against a beginner; or to
activate a simple countermeasure against an expert attacker
who can easily bypass it. Therefore, the assessment of the
attacker’s skill and knowledge level would be very useful to
tune our reaction model. Another point is that the attacker
can have internal knowledge of the IS. For instance, a re-
mote attacker that have the proper credentials, and thus is
able to connect from the first attempt, must be taken in con-
sideration that he/she has internal knowledge and/or high
level of expertise. Another example is the case of or an at-
tacker that is able to predict the tcp sequence of a connection
that uses a complex algorithm (and not use the standard tcp
sequence number incremental algorithm). As we explained
before, each complex attack scenario can be modeled with
an attack graph where the nodes are the elementary action
steps. These elementary steps can be more or less difficult
to be performed, dependently on the attacker’s skills and
target IS internal knowledge.
2.2.1 SK Level Label
To assess the attacker’s skill and knowledge, a defensive
point of view is adopted. From the point of view of the tar-
get IS, the only information about attacker’s actions lays
the generated alerts that instantiates steps of the attack
graph. Each step is described with a specific language like
LAMBDA [16]. We propose to add a new label called Skill
and Knowledge level SK Level. For the attack actions, this
label indicates the minimum level of skill and knowledge
required to execute this action-step successfully. For the
countermeasure, it indicates the value of this level that the
attacker can not bypass once it is activated. This new label
can have the values shown in Table 1. Using the SK Level
values of the executed steps retrieved from the attack graph,
it is possible to assess the attacker’s level of skills and deter-
mine if he/she has already internal knowledge of the target
IS. Another interesting approach consists of not only con-
sidering the SK Level values, but also their sequence with
taking into account the time dimension; however this ap-
proach will not be considered in the present paper.
Table 1. SK Level label values






2.2.2 Attacker’s SK Level and Skill and Knowledge
Efficient Countermeasure Set
We consider that an attacker, capable of executing an at-
tack step that has a high SK Level, is an expert attacker;
Figure 2. Risk Eff CM and SK Eff CM sets
and thus a more sophisticated countermeasure is required.
The attacker’s skill and knowledge Level (SK Level) must
be evaluated to refine the countermeasure selection. A first
approach to assess the attacker’s SK Level is to retrieve
the SK Level maximum value among the successfully ex-
ecuted attack steps. The use of Max function might not be
enough accurate, and further advanced approaches could be
explored. Once the attacker’s SK Level is assessed, only
the countermeasures that have a SK Level greater than the
attacker’s one will be kept. Hence, the selected coun-
termeasure is adapted to the attacker’s Level and a new
set called Skill and Knowledge Efficient countermeasures
(SK EFF CM) can be instantiated.
The correlation engine by determining the executed at-
tack steps by an attacker, is capable of assessing the at-
tacker’s level of skill and knowledge Attacker SK Level.
The first approach to evaluate Attacker SK Level can be
done using the following equation:
Attacker SK Level = Maxi(SK Leveli)
where SK Leveli = Attack Stepi.SK Level, (4)
and Stepi ∈ Executed Steps
A possible method is to set honeypots [20, 26] and redi-
rect the attacker to execute his/her attack steps on them.
This will be used to collect the maximum number of exe-
cuted steps to assess accurately his/her SK Level.
Once the Attacker SK Level had been assessed, only the
countermeasures from Risk Eff CM such that the SK Level
is higher than Attacker SK Level are kept, and a new set
called SK Eff CM (see Figure 2) can be defined and instan-
tiated countermeasures:
∀CMu ∈ Risk Eff CM;
Attacker SK Level ≤ CMu.SK Level (5)
⇒ CMu ∈ SK Eff CM
2.3 Countermeasure Selection Procedure
Once the Risk Eff CM and SK Eff CM have been
instantiated, a clear automatic procedure can be applied to
select the most appropriate countermeasure :
If SK Eff CM 6= ∅
Select(MinSK Level(CMu))
If Risk Eff CM 6= ∅
Select(MinRisk(CMu))
Select(None)
As suggested in this algorithm, countermeasures that be-
long to SK Eff CM set has the highest priority because they
are adapted to the attacker’s skill and knowledge level, and
they are capable of reducing the overall risk gravity. If no
such countermeasure could be found, the search moves to
the Risk Eff CM, and the selected countermeasure is able to
reduce the overall risk without being adapted to SK Level
of the attacker. Finally, where Risk Eff CM is empty, no
countermeasure will be selected because all the candidate
countermeasures are not risk aware; in other words they will
increase overall risk.
3 Implementation of the Solution
CRIM (Correlation and Recognition of Malicious Inten-
tions) [11] is a prototype that has been developed by TELE-
COM Bretagne. It implements the fusion, semi-explicit cor-
relation and anti-correlation features using the LAMBDA
language [16]. It collects the generated alerts and aggre-
gates them. Then CRIM visualizes the detected attacks in
real time, the future steps that can be executed by the at-
tacker using the semi-explicit correlation principle, and the
candidate countermeasure using the anti-correlation princi-
ple. As a proof of concept, a new module has been created
to validate our proposal briefly described in the previous
sections.
As shown in Figure 3, this module is used to assess the
Risk Gravity of the detected attack scenarii and the candi-
date countermeasures, then it instantiates the Risk Eff CM
countermeasure set. A first version of this module has
been developed, but no public version is yet released. An-
other module takes in charge of assessing the attackers
SK Level and compare it to the SK Level of the counter-
measures that belong to the Risk Eff CM, then it instan-
tiates the SK Eff CM set. Once the two sets are instanti-
ated, the selection procedure can be applied to activate the
most appropriate and effective countermeasure. Works are
in progress to develop a first version of this module. Early
tests had been performed using a LAMBDA library contain-
ing 25 step actions, 5 countermeasures, and 4 main scenarii:
Code-Red attack, Trinoo attack, Sapphire attack, and Mit-
Figure 3. CRIM output: Attack graph, Intru-
sion objectives, Attack risk gravity, reaction
risk gravity, Attacker’s SK Level
nick attack; interested readers can refer to [1] for detailed
descriptions of these attack scenarii. Due to lack of space,
only the last attack scenario will be presented in this paper.
The Figure 3 shows the output of the CRIM proto-
type corresponding to the detection of the Mitnick at-
tack. The Mitnick attack aims to gain remote illegal
shell by causing a denial of service on a legal machine
and then stealing its pre-established tcp connection with
the target machine. Thus, the attack graph generated
by CRIM using the LAMBDA language is composed of
four elementary steps: syn flood, tcp sequence prediction,
ip spoofing, spoofed remote shell. The intrusion objective
is illegal remote shell We suppose that the attacker was ca-
pable to execute successfully the first three steps. There-
fore one final step remains before the attacker achieves his
or her intrusion objective Illegal Remote Shell on a critical
machine. Dark green (or gray in white and black version)
circles represent elementary steps of the intrusion scenario,
light yellow lozenges correspond to candidate reaction and
boxes are intrusion objectives. The attacker has executed
successfully the first three steps, and thus only one step
remains. Therefore the potentiality and therefore the To-
tal Risk Grav have high values (=4). In other hand, the at-
tacker’s SK Level = Max(1,3,2) = 3.
There are two candidate countermeasures capable of re-
ducing the total gravity risk from 4 to 1 (see Total Risk CMx
in Figure 3), therefore the two countermeasures are in the
Risk Eff CM. The attacker’s skill and knowledge level is 3
and that indicates the fact he or she is not a novice. Thus,
a block connection that has a SK Level = 2 could be not ef-
ficient and a firewall reconfiguration that has a SK Level =
3 is needed. Hence, only the second countermeasure is in
SK Eff CM and recommended to be launched.
4 Related Works
Intrusion detection systems with reaction capabilities
like SNORT [10] already exist. SNORT offers reflex reac-
tion when a given attack is detected like blocking packets,
sending visible warning and logging. No advanced reason-
ing on the reaction consequence is conducted, and side ef-
fects could appear with devastating consequences. Many
industrial solutions exist like IBM Internet Security [7] and
Cisco Secure IDS [3]. These solutions are efficient in in-
trusion prevention and offer protection against well known
attacks with the corresponding impact using database like
CVSS [8]. The main drawback is that there is no follow-
ing up and no monitoring of the detected attacks to assess
their risks and impacts in real time once they bypassed the
security and prevention measures, dependably on the target
organizations and assets. Another limitation is that these
solutions handle vulnerabilities exploit without consider-
ing the complete scenarii. On other hand, there are several
Risk Assessment methods like EBIOS [6, 2], MARION [4],
MEHARI [5], etc. These methods are used to manage sys-
tem assets and evaluate the risk that threatens these assets;
they are unfortunately abstract, informal and incompatible
with intrusion detection and computer systems: Many el-
ements and parameters are related to physical and nature
disasters (fire, earthquake, failure, etc.). There are also el-
ements that need redefinition to be compatible with the in-
trusion detection systems like potentiality and impact of a
threat. As suggested in [25], the risk exposure can be evalu-
ated in terms of business perspective by using financial met-
rics. Another problem is that these methods are not adapted
to be used in real-time. Our goal is to evaluate the sys-
tem and the available countermeasure actions in real-time
to help the administrator to chose the best countermeasure,
and even make the reaction process automatic with mini-
mum human intervention.
5 Conclusion and Future works
A first version of the risk analysis module has been im-
plemented, and current works is being conducted to develop
the Skill and Knowledge Assessment module. Further Se-
ries of tests will be conducted to evaluate the effectiveness
and the performance of these added modules.
In the future, attack and countermeasure will be mod-
eled with LAMBDA models, and attacks simulations will
Figure 4. ReD Reaction workflow deployment
be conducted for VoIP services: CRIM will control and su-
pervise the VoIP services status, detect and recognize at-
tacks in real time, then conduct a Risk analysis and Skill
and Knowledge assessment to propose to the administra-
tor, or to the automated reaction module, the most effec-
tive countermeasure. This will be conducted in the ReD
(REaction after detection) project [9] with other industrial
partners. ReD proposes an auto adaptive model (see Figure
4) that starts from the security policy management of the
monitored IS. The low level tools including intrusion detec-
tion and access control mechanisms that are implemented
locally to monitor the IS are configured according to the
high level security specifications. Then, according to the
different alerts generated, the alerts are forwarded to the
upper level whenever it is necessary, after crossing the dif-
ferent reaction levels, to evaluate the current system state
where either direct responses are launched or the whole se-
curity policy is changed according to the detected threat.
We define three levels of reaction; (1) low level reaction,
(2) intermediate level reaction, and (3) high level reaction.
Each level considers particular security requirements and
deploys appropriate security components and mechanisms
to react against the detected threats.
The risk analysis and attacker’s Skill and Knowledge As-
sessment approach proposed in this paper will be integrated
in ReD framework, and more precisely in the ACE (Alert
Correlation Engine) and RDP (Reaction Decision Point)
modules. The first is responsible for attack identification
and diagnosis by constructing ongoing attack scenarii ac-
cording to the alerts generated by the sensors. The sec-
ond module decides which reactions should be triggered ac-
cording to the attack scenarii received from the ACE. The
selected reaction will be deployed by the REP (Reaction
Enforcement Point) and PEP (Policy Enforcement Point).
Our approach will turn these two modules more intelligent
and risk-aware, by assessing the attacks and reaction in-
duced risks on the entire IS. Therefore the intermediate level
and high level reactions will be adapted with the organiza-
tion policy and take in consideration impact and risks con-
straints compliantly with the organization needs and strat-
egy. Moreover, another is being developed to communicate
the attack graph, candidate countermeasures, risk analysis
results, and skill and knowledge assessment results to the
security console. This console will visualize graphically
these data. Interested readers can refer to [9] for more de-
tails about ReD architecture.
In ReD framework, when the Mitnick attack (see section
III) is detected, three reactions levels will be activated:
• Low level reaction: At this level, reflex measures like
logging the attacker activity and the incoming packets,
or dropping spoofed IP packets, can be activated. The
activation of these reaction measures does not require
high intelligence level.
• Intermediate level reaction: As presented in section III,
the most efficient countermeasure will be selected to
end the ongoing attack. At this level, the reaction pro-
cedure selection is more intelligent.
• High level reaction: This reaction level aims not only
to end the detected attack, but also prevents the oc-
currence of this attack in the future by activating or
redefining the security policy. In ReD project, the Or-
Bac model [22] has been chosen as a security policy
model. In OrBac, special contexts can be defined and
activated when an attack is detected. In the case of
Mitnick attack, the proper security policy context will
be selected, and the activated security policy rules will
be deployed on PEPs (e.g. firewalls, files and account
rights, etc.).
Intrusion detection systems aim to detect attacks, how-
ever such detection is not quite useful without reaction.
Against given attacks, there could be many possible coun-
termeasures. Our approach will help administrators taking
their decisions and selecting the proper countermeasure(s)
by assessing the impact of both detected attacks and the can-
didate countermeasures, and taking in consideration the at-
tacker’s skill and knowledge level. As we know, no similar
approach exists in the literature. We are even conducting
further research and tests to turn the reaction selection and
activation process fully automated.
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